Planned the chart was made in deployments of BMD capable ships as of Ships with this advanced capability operate with an Aegis BMD 5. Currently only about 3 destroyers out of the 33 BMD capable ships are equipped with the 5.
Ships without this advanced capability can be configured to perform either the anti-air or the anti-ballistic missile mission, but not both simultaneously. These ships include both cruisers and destroyers with the basic 3. In September, the U.
Navy through The new projection removes from the count newly BMD equipped destroyers whose crews did not have at least six months of required training and cruisers that would lose their BMD capability as a result of a modernization see below. Figure 2. Projection of the number of BMD capable ships out to The blue circles show the total number of BMD capable ships. The numbers are broken down in more detail in Table 1 at the end of this post.
Beyond the growth in the number of BMD ships flattens out as Block IIA retirements are almost matched by the deployment of new ships. Figure 2 above shows my attempt to project the number of Aegis capable ships out to There are several factors that determine how the number of both Aegis BMD capable ships and those with the advanced BMD capability will increase over the next twenty five years:. As recently as a few years ago, the Navy planned to upgrade all 62 of its existing Aegis destroyers to the advanced BMD capability.
However, due to budget pressures in the last few years, these plans have been significantly scaled back. In , it was announced that only seven of the 28 Flight I and Flight II destroyers would be upgraded to the advanced capability.
The remaining 21 Flight 1 and 2 ships will only be upgraded to the intermediate capability 4. A note on how I am counting dates for upgrades: I am taking the date an upgrade is completed as the date the hardware installation was completed plus six months for training. The date of hardware completion is taking from Figure 3 below. For example, the first upgrade to the advanced capability as signified by the orange band in the upper right quadrant and the green check mark was to DDG, and was completed in September Adding six months for training, I then count this ship as upgraded as of FY Figure 3.
However, it was recently revealed that five of these ships DDGs 83, 85, 89, 90 and 96 will not undergo this upgrade, and thus will be left without a BMD capability. I assume that the 29 other Flight IIA ships will be upgraded to the advanced capability: the first 17 using the dates in Figure 3, and the other twelve at a rate of two per year thereafter.
Aegis Flight I and Flight II destroyers have a 35 year lifespan and the modernizations and upgrades they are receiving does not affect this lifespan. Thus I assume that each of these ships is retired is retired 35 years after its commissioning. For example, the first Aegis destroyer, DDG, was commissioned in , and so I remove it from my count in The computer-based command and decision element is the core of the Aegis combat system.
This interface makes the Aegis combat system capable of simultaneous operations against multi-mission threats: anti-air, anti-surface and anti-submarine warfare. The Navy built the first Aegis cruisers using the hull and machinery designs of Spruance class destroyers.
A smaller ship was designed using an improved sea-keeping hull form, reduced infrared and radar cross section and upgrades to the Aegis Combat System. DDG 51s are constructed in flights, allowing technological advances during construction. Flight II, introduced in fiscal year FY 92 , incorporated improvements to the SPY radar, active electronic countermeasures and communications.
Flight IIA, introduced in FY 94, consisted of DDG 79 and follow-on destroyers, which added a helicopter hangar with space for two multi-mission helicopters. The Navy has decided to restart construction of new DDG 51s.
The new Aegis destroyer will utilize software componentized to enable reuse and networked-based COTS computing system infrastructures during installation, modifications, and future upgrades.
While the SPY-1 could stretch meet these demands, it required diverting resources away from the air search mission. The workaround resulted in a bifurcation between Aegis BMD and the Aegis Combat System that governed nearly everything else on the ship. In October , the Navy had received 12 of the first deployable version of the Standard Missile-3s, the SM-3 Block I only twelve of this model was ever built. By , this number would increase to 18 BMD engagement-capable ships—three cruisers and 15 destroyers.
Long-range air defense and ship self-defense missions were even more severely degraded when Aegis 3. Aegis ships could do the BMD mission, or they could do everything else, but could not do both at the same time.
It gave the ships a limited self-defense capability while conducting BMD operations. In , the newly elected Obama administration reexamined the U.
One its most consequential decisions was to replace the proposed emplacements of 10 ground-based interceptors in Europe with a new plan it called the European Phased Adaptive Approach EPAA. What you can do with an SM-3 in affordability and in deployment and dispersal is substantially greater for larger numbers of missiles than we what we have with a ground-based interceptor. A single Aegis can carry a hundred-plus or minus a few, depending on their mission configuration, of the SM The architecture, expressly created to counter a limited ballistic missile attack from the Middle East, would proceed in four phases.
All told, the completion of EPAA would require the development of:. Work on the SM-3 IB had been ongoing for several years prior to policy declaration, completing its critical design review in July of Serial production of the IB began in , with an initial delivery of 16 SM-3 IBs to the fleet by the end of that year, and the interceptor was declared operationally deployed in The SM-3was perhaps the biggest departure in Standard Missile airframe design since the inclusion of the third stage in the Terrier Leap flights of the early s.
This increased the amount propulsion that could be got while still able to fit inside the Mk 41 VLS tube. The kill vehicle was also larger, with more maneuverability, owed to an improved DACS with more fuel and thus greater divert capability. The increased speed and divert resulted in an interceptor design that has a much greater defended area than previous SM-3 variants.
It also makes the interceptor more capable against faster, longer-range ballistic missiles, such as IRBMs and possibly ICBMs in their late midcourse or early descent phase. SM-3 IIA flight testing has experienced several starts and fits. It had its first two flight tests in June and December , and it achieved a successful intercept on its first attempt against an MRBM target in February It failed its following two intercept test attempts.
In a flight against an IRBM target in June , a sailor misidentified the intermediate-range target as friendly, causing the interceptor to self-destruct.
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